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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
In accordance with §78-2a-3(2)(j) Utah Code Annotated, the Utah Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction over this appeal by order of transfer by the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah pursuant to §78-2-2(4) Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

The trial court erred by dismissing Plaintiff/Appellant Scholzen's
Complaint against Defendants/Appellees Palmers according to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures.

This issue was preserved in the trial court for appeal by specific argument in
Defendants' memorandum in support of Defendants' motion to dismiss (Index 991, Pages
24-107) and by further argument in Plaintiffs memorandum in objection to Defendants'
motion to dismiss (Index 99, Pages 110-237) and by oral argument Reporter's Transcript of
Proceedings, Motion to Dismiss (Index 99, Page 270 at Pages 1-112)
H.

The trial court erred by dismissing Plaintiff/Appellant Scholzen's
Complaint against Defendants/Appellees Palmers on the grounds
that Scholzen's six causes of action were barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.

This issue was preserved for appeal in the trial court by specific argument in
Defendants' memorandum in support of Defendants' motion to dismiss (Index 99, Pages 24!

Two records have been indexed for appeal in this matter. In order to refer to each,
separate record in a clear manner, Appellant will refer to the record in Case No. 970500787,
Dockstaderv. Scholzen. as "Index 97" and will refer to the record in Case No. 990500428,
Scholzen v. Palmer, as "Index 99".
2

At the time this Appellate Brief was prepared, the clerk of the trial court had not
paginated the hearing transcripts in each case. Therefore, Appellant will refer to the page
that each such transcript begins on in the indexed record, and will then refer to the specific
page numbers within such transcripts.
1

107) and in Plaintiffs memorandum in support of Plaintiff s objection to motion to dismiss
(Index 99, Pages 110-237), and by oral argument (Index 99, Pages 270 at Pages 1-11).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of this particular case on appeal is the "correctness standard",
while giving no deference to the trial court's ruling.
When reviewing a court's grant of a rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, "we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as
true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be
drawnfromthem in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." St.
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194,196
(Utah 1991). "Because the propriety of a rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal is a question of law, we give the trial court's ruling no
deference and review it under a correctness standard." Id.
Alvarez v. Galetka. 933 P.2d 987, 312 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 1997)
See also, Prows v. State. 822 P.2d 764,175 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 1991) and Colman v.
Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
This case consists of claims by Plaintiff/Appellant Scholzen Products Company, a
Utah Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Scholzen") against Defendants/Appellees Kent
Palmer and Robin Palmer (hereinafter referred to as Palmer) for certain tortious acts,
including claims for fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith, and
willful misconduct.

2

Course of Proceedings:
Scholzen filed a complaint founded in tort against Palmer. (Index 99, Pages 1-12)
Service of Process was had by Acceptance of Service signed by Palmer's counsel.
(Index 99, Pages 14 and 15)
Palmer did not answer Scholzen's complaint but ino\ ed loi dismissal according to
Rule 12(b)(6). (Index 99, Pages 21-23)
Memoranda were filed by Palmer and Scholzen. Each memorandum included
materials extraneous to the pleadings. (Index 99, Pages 24-107 and 100-237)
Oral argument was had on Palmer's Motion to Dismiss. (Index 99, Pages 270-at
Pages 1-11)
Disposition by Trial Court:
The trial court granted Palmer's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed Scholzen's
complaint. (Index 99, Pages 256-260)
Following the trial court's order, a timely Notice of Appeal was filed with the
Supreme Court ofthe State of Utah. (Index 99, Page 261) The Supreme Court ofthe State
of Utah transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 4th day of May, 1995, Scholzen and Palmer entered into a Purchase and Sale
Agreement for a 45% interest in real property owned by Scholzen as a tenant in common
with Dale Dockstader, Dale Huntsman and Russell J. Gallian (those parties will hereinafter

be referred to as "Dockstader Parties"). Said property is located in Washington County,
Utah. (Index 99, Page 3, Paragraph 17; Index 97, Pages 245-257)
A month before entering into the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Palmer (April,
1995), Scholzen had entered into a "Settlement Agreement" settling certain disputes
between Scholzen and Dockstader Parties. (Index 99, Page 3, Paragraph 16; Index 97, Page
2, Paragraph 10; Index 97, attachment Exhibit B, Pages 10-17)
The Settlement Agreement between Scholzen and the Dockstader Parties included
language stating as follows:
Additionally, the selling party shall obtain an agreement with
the Palmers and/or their assigns, such that Palmers will donate
20 additional feet of their property located on the west side of
the Virgin River such that said twenty feet combined with
Dockstader easement will be used as a roadway access from
Highway 9 to the property that is the subject matter of this
agreement.
(Index 97, Page 3, Paragraph 11 and Page 14, Paragraph 13.e.)
On the same day as the execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement (the 4th day
of May, 1995), Scholzen delivered extensive documents relating to the real property in
question to Palmer. These documents included the April, 1995 Settlement Agreement
between Dockstader Parties and Scholzen, and copies of Quit-Claim Deeds made pursuant
to and in accordance with the April, 1995 Settlement Agreement between Dockstader Parties
and Scholzen. The Quit-Claim Deeds contained the following term:
subject to the terms of the Settlement Agreement entered into
between grantor and grantee on February 9, 1995, which
Settlement Agreement discusses issues of access to the property
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between the grantor and grantee, and a co-tenancy agreement
regarding the development of the property.
(Index 99, Page 3, Paragraph 18; and Index 97, Page 238-243)
On May 30, 1995, Palmer by and through his attorney of record, Shawn C. Ferrin,
attorney for Palmer, acknowledged that conveyance of the property to be sold to Palmers,
pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement between Scholzen and Palmer, was subject to
a settlement agreement and a co-tenancy agreement. Mr. Ferrin also acknowledged that that
Mr. Palmer had been provided a copy of the settlement agreement. (Index 99, Page 4,
Paragraph 19; Index 97, Pages 268-269)
From May 4,1995 to September 30,1996, Palmer, for themselves and by and through
their attorney, Shawn Ferrin, performed extensive due diligence pursuant to the Purchase
and Sale Agreement both verbally and in writing. (Index 99, Page 4, Paragraph 21; Index
97, Pages 211-213, 221-222, 265-301)
Prior to September 30,1996, Shawn Ferrin as attorney for and on behalf of Palmer,
prepared closing documents, including a form Warranty Deed, said form Warranty Deed
contained no deed restriction referencing the Settlement Agreement entered into between
Dockstader and Scholzen. (Index 99, Page 4, Paragraph 22)
On or before September 30,1996, Scholzen's counsel, for an on behalf of Scholzen,
requested a deed restriction from Shawn Ferrin, attorney for Palmer, which deed restriction
would reference the Settlement Agreement between Dockstader and Scholzen. Shawn
Ferrin indicated that Palmer was out of town and would not be able to review the deed
restriction. Shawn Ferrin further indicated that Palmer was fully aware of the requirement
5

to provide a 20-foot easement for access across his property, and Mr. Ferrin also said that
Palmer would be subj ect to the Settlement Agreement. Shawn Ferrin indicated that Palmer's
portion of the purchase agreement was subject to a 1031, tax-free exchange, and that the
closing had to be completed by the 30th of September, 1996, or Palmer would lose their
1031 exchange favorable tax treatment. Shawn Ferrin, for and in behalf of Palmer,
requested that Scholzen execute the Warranty Deed as it was prepared by him, without the
deed restriction, as an accommodation to Palmer, and that Palmer would thereafter
acknowledge and be responsible for the Settlement Agreement.. (Index 99, Pages 4-5,
Paragraph 24)
In reliance upon the specific representations of Shawn Ferrin, for and in behalf of
Palmer, to Clifford V. Dunn, as attorney for Scholzen, and based upon the specific
understanding by Scholzen that the Warranty Deed and the other agreements for the sale
were not intended to be a fully integrated agreement, so that Palmer would be subject to the
Settlement Agreement, Scholzen executed the Warranty Deed and concluded the closing.
(Index 99, Page 5, Paragraph 25)
At the time the property interest was sold to Palmer, and prior thereto, Scholzen
specifically informed Palmer of Palmer's duty and responsibility to provide a 20-foot
easement pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. (Index 99, Page 5, Paragraph 26)
After the sale of the propertyfromScholzen to Palmer, and in furtherance of Palmer's
obligation to provide a 20-foot easement, Palmer and Dockstader entered into specific and
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detailed negotiations for the establishment of that easement beneficial to both pieces of
property. (Index 99, Page 5, Paragraph 27; and Index 97, Pages 221-222)
Palmer and Dockstader entered into a verbal understanding as to the location and
width of the easement, such as to benefit the subject property. (Index 99, Page 5, Paragraph
28)
When the negotiations between Palmer and Dockstader had been virtually concluded,
Dockstader insisted that the described easement be used to benefit land adjacent to the
subject property but not anticipated to be benefitted by any Settlement Agreement for any
purpose. (Index 99, Page 5, Paragraph 29)
On April 30,1997, Dockstader Partiesfiledwith the Fifth Judicial District Court, in
and for Washington County, State of Utah, a Complaint naming Scholzen Products Co. and
Kent and Robin Palmer as Defendants. (Index 99, Pages 1-17)
The Dockstader Parties complained against Scholzen for breach of contract for failure
to obtain an additional 20-foot easement as required by the Settlement Agreement. (Index
97, Pages 4-5, Paragraphs 17-21)
On July 1,1997, Scholzen filed its answer, counterclaim and crossclaim. (Index 97,
Pages 22-31)
The crossclaim filed by Scholzen against Palmer in the case of Dockstader v.
Scholzen and Palmer, was a claim for indemnification of any damages incurred in the
defense of the litigation of Dockstader. (Index 97, Pages 28-30)
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In the case of Dockstader. a series of motions were made. A second motion for
summary judgment against Scholzen by Dockstader Parties, Palmer's motion for summary
judgment against Scholzen on Scholzen9s crossclaim, Scholzen9s motion to amend its
answer, counterclaim and crossclaim and Scholzen9s motion to amend scheduling order.
All such motions were supported by memoranda. (Index 97, Pages 386-389,416-533)
Prior to the oral argument on the motions, Scholzen acknowledged that its crossclaim
for indemnification was not supportable. (Index 97, Page 575)
At the above-described oral argument, the trial court stated that Palmer's motion for
summary judgment on the simple claim for indemnification should be granted or that the
claim should be abandoned. That was acknowledged by counsel for Scholzen. (Index 97,
Page 746 at Page 27, lines 13-18)
The trial court in the Dockstader case then entered its Memorandum Decision, which
decision stated that Scholzen had conceded Palmer9 s motion, and that Scholzen9 s crossclaim
for indemnification should be dismissed. (Index 97, Page 724)
Scholzen9s motion to amend its answer and crossclaim, to allow for the prosecution
of claims against Palmer was denied and no such answer and crossclaim was ever filed.
(Index 97, Pages 725)
On March 16, 1999, Scholzen filed a complaint in the instant action against Kent
Palmer and Robin Palmer, alleging six causes of action: Fraud in the inducement, for
recission; fraud in the inducement, damages; negligent misrepresentation; bad faith,

8

recission; bad faith, damages; and willful misconduct, punitive damages. (Index 99, Pages
6-12)
On or about the 9th day of April, 1999, Palmer filed its motion to dismiss, with
supporting memorandum. (Index 99, Pages 21-107)
Oral argument was had on Palmer's motion to dismiss on the 26th day of May, 1999.
(Index 99, Pages 270 at Pages 1-11)
The court signed the order dismissing the case on the 16th day of June, 1999; the
order dismissing Scholzen's case was entered on the 17th day of June, 1999. (Index 99,
Page 258-260)
Scholzen's Notice of Appeal was filed the 14th day of July, 1999. (Index 99, Page
261)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court dismissed Scholzen's complaint on motion by Palmer, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Palmer based its motion to dismiss on
the grounds that Scholzen's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, and that Scholzen's complaint was barred by the Doctrine of Res Judicata.
The trial court erred in dismissing Scholzen's complaint on the grounds that the
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Scholzen's complaint
alleges sufficient facts and there are reasonable inferencesfromthose allegations to support
claims for fraud, bad faith, negligent misrepresentation, or willful misconduct.

9

Scholzen's complaint alleges that Palmer knew about the Settlement Agreement
between Scholzen and Dockstader. That Palmer purposely led Scholzen to believe that they
agreed to be bound by and subject to the Settlement Agreement between Scholzen and
Dockstader.
At the very last minute, Palmer induced Scholzen to go through with the closing
without a deed restriction on the Warranty Deed to help Palmer help complete a 1031
exchange within the time limit set by the Internal Revenue Code. Because Palmer and his
counsel had been so communicative about the Settlement Agreement and because of the
specific representations of Palmer for themselves and by and through their attorney of
record, Scholzen was induced to go through with the closing without a Warranty Deed
restriction.
After the closing had been completed, Palmer acted for all purposes as though he
would be bound by and subject to the Settlement Agreement. Palmer entered into extensive
negotiations with Dockstader to provide twenty feet of property to created a buildable
ingress and egress.
Even after Dockstader filed suit, Palmer continued to act as if he would be bound by
and subject to the Settlement Agreement and continued extensive negotiations to settle the
entire litigation.
Finally, after all of those representations and all of those actions, Palmer then asserted
by affidavit that he was not bound by or subject to the Settlement Agreement. In spite of
saying they would be bound by the Settlement Agreement, and in spite of acting like they
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were bound before and after Dockstader filing suit, Palmer brought a motion for summary
judgment based upon, among other things, the Statute of Frauds and other contractual
defenses.
The factual assertions as found in Scholzen's complaint, supply the elements required
to establish fraud.3 There are certainly sufficient allegations in Scholzen's complaint to
support the claims of bad faith,4 and the claims of negligent misrepresentation5, and of
willful misconduct6.

3

Which elements are: "(1) a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be
false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to
base such a representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing that other party to act upon it; (6)
that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon
it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to that party's injury and damage." Turner v.
General Adjustment Bureau, Inc.. 832 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
4

The elements of bad faith are:"... one or more of the following factors existed: (i)
The party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party
intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted
with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others."
Cadv v.Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)
5

The elements of negligent misrepresentation are: "The tort of negligent misrepresentation, which provides that a party injured by reasonable reliance upon a second party's
careless or negligent misrepresentation of a material fact may recover damages resulting
from that injury when the second party had a pecuniary interest in the transaction, was in a
superior position to know the material facts, and should have reasonably foreseen that the
injured party was likely to rely upon the fact. Jardine v. Brunswick. 18 Utah 2d 378, 381,
423 P.2d 659, 661-62 (1967); Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co..
Utah, 666 P.2d 302, 305 (1983)" Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins. Brown & Gunnel. 713
P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1988)
6

The elements of willful misconduct are: "The line of culpability between that
conduct which is simply negligent and that conduct which is clearly intentional is a matter
of degree. And at some point along the line, accumulated aggravation of negligence
amounts to willful misconduct." Strange v. Ostlund. 594 P.2d 877 (Utah 1979)
11

The dismissal of Scholzen9 s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is obvious error because the complaint by Scholzen adequately establishes
the elements of the tortious acts claimed.
Palmer claims that the lawsuit entitled Dockstader et al. v. Scholzen et aL and the
results of that lawsuit, act as a bar to Scholzen's complaint because of the Doctrine of Res
Judicata. Res Judicata has two branches, Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion. Under the
Doctrine of Claim Preclusion, the Dockstader case and the Scholzen v. Palmer case, which
is subject to this appeal, must (i) involve the same parties, (ii) the claims presented must
have been presented in thefirstsuit and must be one that could and should have been raised
in thefirstaction; and (iii) the claims that were presented in thefirstsuit must have resulted
in a final judgment on the merits. In this particular action, the Dockstader case and the
Scholzen case have the same parties only with respect to a crossclaim for indemnification.
The only claim litigated in the Dockstader case between Scholzen and Palmer was a
crossclaim for indemnification. The crossclaim for indemnification did not include any
claim for tortious acts. The crossclaim for indemnification did not include a claim for fraud,
or bad faith, or negligent misrepresentation, or willful misconduct. The crossclaim for
indemnification was specifically limited to the claim that Palmer had agreed to be bound by
and subject to the Settlement Agreement. The trial court in Dockstader found that Palmer
had not agreed to be bound by and subject to the Settlement Agreement. There was
absolutely nofindingby the trial court relating to tortious acts by Palmer. Therefore, Claim
Preclusion of Res Judicata does not apply.
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The second branch of Res Judicata is Collateral Estoppel or Issue Preclusion. Issue
Preclusion requires four elements. Again, in the Dockstader and Scholzen case, there were
the same parties in the crossclaim for indemnification alone. The issues relating to
indemnification were decided by the summary judgment granted by Judge Beacham. The
issues in the second case between Scholzen and Palmer, relating to tortious acts, were not
filed with the court and therefore the issues relating to the elements of tortious acts were not
presented. Judge Beacham would not allow Scholzen to amend its crossclaim to bring in
claims for tortious acts so those issues relating to tortious acts were not litigated. Issue
Preclusion does not bar Scholzen's complaint because there is not any similarity in the issues
presented between the crossclaim in the Dockstader case and the complaint in the Scholzen
case.
Scholzen's complaint should not have been dismissed by the trial court for any
reason. Certainly not on the grounds of a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted or because Scholzen's Complaint is barred by the Doctrine of Res Judicata.
ARGUMENT
L

The trial court erred by dismissing Appellant/Plaintiff
Scholzen's complaint according to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Palmers moved the trial court to dismiss Scholzen's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, citing the following grounds: (1) "The Complaint,
including six causes of action asserted therein is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and
should be dismissed"; (2) "The complaint should be dismissed because there is no legal basis
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for the six causes of action thus fails to state claims against Palmers upon which relief can
be granted". (Index 99, Page 22)
The Honorable James Shumate of the Fifth Judicial Court in and for Washington
County, granted Palmers' motion to dismiss without direct comment. (Index 99, Page 259)7
Judge Shumate's ruling " . . . is appropriate only where it clearly appears that the
plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any
stated facts that could prove to support their claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795
P.2d 622,624 (Utah 1990) as quoted in Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764,175 Utah Adv. Rep.
6, (Utah 1991)
The court of appeals, in reviewing the Honorable Judge Shumate's ruling for
correctness, " . . . must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital supra; also as quoted in Prows
v. State, supra.
It is Scholzen's position that the allegations of Scholzen's complaint clearly state
claims upon which relief can be granted.
A,

The allegations of Scholzen's of Scholzen's complaint
state claims upon which relief can be granted.

Scholzen's complaint alleges six different causes of action. The first cause of action
is based in Fraud in the Inducement and requests recission. (Index 99, Pages 6 and 7)
7

Judge Shumate's only apparent comments relating to his reasons for dismissing
Scholzen's complaint were, "are you willing to take it up on appeal." (Index 99, Page 270
at Page 8, lines 21 and 22)
14

The second cause of action is based in Fraud in the Inducement and requests, as
relief, the award of damages. (Index 99, Pages 7-9)
The third cause of action alleges Negligent Misrepresentation and requests an award
of damages. (Index 99, Page 9)
Scholzen's fourth cause of action alleges Bad Faith and requests recission. (Index
99, Page 9-10)
The fifth cause of action alleges Bad Faith and requests damages. (Index 99, Page
10)
The sixth cause of action alleges Willful Misconduct and requests punitive damages.
(Index 99, Page 11)
Each of the above causes of action are based upon factual assertions contained in
Scholzen's complaint. (Index 99, Pages 1 -6) Which factual assertions are sufficient to grant
relief to Scholzen as prayed, particularly when such factual allegations are accepted as true,
and all reasonable inferences from those factual allegations are viewed in the light most
favorable to Scholzen. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital supra.
1.

The allegations of Scholzen's complaint are adequate
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for
Fraud in the Inducement.

Scholzen's first and second causes of action are based in Fraud, specifically, Fraud
in the Inducement. The elements of Fraud are well established. They are:
(1) a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly,
knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to
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base such a representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing that
other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to that party's
injury and damage.
Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau. Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
Each of those elements of Fraud have been properly plead in Scholzen's complaint
as follows:
(1)

A representation was made:

"Shawn Ferrin further indicated that Palmer was fully aware of the requirement to
provide a 20-foot easement for access across his property and further that Palmer would be
subject to the Settlement Agreement". (Index 99, Pages 4 and 5, Paragraph 24). Palmer, by
and through their counsel, and for himself, acknowledged the existence of the Settlement
Agreement and that the Settlement Agreement relating to the Scholzen/Dockstader property
was binding upon successors in interest. (See also, Index 99, Pages 3-4, Paragraphs 13-20)
(2)

The representations which were made concerned a presently existing material

fact:
When the sale of the property closed between Palmer and Scholzen, on the 30th day
of September, 1996, the Settlement Agreement between Dockstader and Scholzen was in
effect, had been effect since April of 1995, and had been thoroughly and completely
reviewed by Palmer and his counsel The Settlement Agreement contained the specific
language as follows:
Additionally, the selling party shall obtain an agreement with
the Palmers and/or their assigns, such that Palmers will donate
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20 additional feet of their property located on the west side of
the Virgin River such that said twenty feet combined with
Dockstader easement will be used as a roadway access from
Highway 9 to the property that is the subject matter of this
agreement.
(Index 99, Page 53, Paragraph 14)
The Quit-Claim Deeds, with the deed restrictions, which gave Scholzen its title to the
property being sold to Palmer, had also been delivered to Palmer, and had been in existence
and had been recorded since April, 1995. (Index 97, Pages 134-139)
Palmer represented that he would be responsible for the then existing Settlement
Agreement. (Index 99, Pages 4-5, Paragraph 24) Palmer also represented that Palmer would
be subject to the then existing Settlement Agreement. (Index 99, Page 5, Paragraph 25)
(3)

Which representation was false:

Palmer now says that he did not really agree to be bound by the Settlement
Agreement. (Index 97, Page 45, Paragraph 8)
(4)

Which the representor either knew to be false or made recklessly, knowing that

there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation:
Palmer knew about the Settlement Agreement. He had received all of the documents,
including the Settlement Agreement and Quit-Claim Deeds with deed restrictions. Based
upon the pleadings and activities of Palmer since September 30,1996, Palmer knew that his
statements and actions leading Scholzen to believe they would be subject to the Settlement
Agreement, were false.(Index 99, Pages 4-5, Paragraphs 19-21 and 24)
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(5)

For the purpose of inducing that other party to act upon it:

Scholzen's complaint specifically alleges such intention:
In reliance upon the specific representations of Shawn Ferrin,
for and in behalf of Palmer, to Clifford V. Dunn, as attorney for
Scholzen, and based upon the specific understanding by
Scholzen that the Warranty Deed and the other agreements for
the sale were not intended to be a fully integrated agreement,
such that Palmer would be subject to the Settlement Agreement,
Scholzen executed the Warranty Deed and concluded the
closing.
(Index 99, Page 5, Paragraph 25)
(6)

That the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity:

Scholzen, by and through their attorney, Clifford V. Dunn, and for themselves, had
extensive negotiations and discussions with Palmer. In all of those discussions and
representations, Palmer acted as though he would be bound by the Settlement Agreement.
Scholzen's Complaint alleges as follows:
"In December of 1994, Palmer made inquiry into Settlement Agreements involving
Scholzen and Dockstader." (Index 99, Page 2, Paragraph 10)
"On January 27, 1995, Scholzen filed a Notice of Default against Dockstader for
failure to pay on a Trust Deed Note." (Index 99, Page 2, Paragraph 11)
"On February 9,1995, Scholzen and Dockstader concluded negotiations regarding
a Settlement Agreement and Dockstader executed the Settlement Agreement." (Index 99,
Page 2, Paragraph 12)
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"Between February 9,1995, and March 30,1995, Palmer and Dockstader entered into
discussions regarding easements and access to the property subject to the Settlement
Agreement." (Index 99, Page 3, Paragraph 13)
"Pursuant to the discussions between Palmer and Dockstader, a paragraph was
proposed by Dockstader to Scholzen, regarding access and easements to the property subject
to the Settlement Agreement." (Index 99, Page 3, Paragraph 14)
"On the 4th day of May, 1995, documents were delivered to Palmer, personally,
which documents included the April, 1995 Settlement Agreement which included the new
Paragraph 14, together with copies of Quit-Claim Deeds, made pursuant to the April, 1995
Settlement Agreement, which contained the terms, 'subject to the terms of the Settlement
Agreement entered into between grantor and grantee on February 9,1995, which Settlement
Agreement discusses issues of access to the property between the grantor and grantee, and
a co-tenancy agreement regarding development of said property.'" (Index 99, Page 3,
Paragraph 18)
"On the 30th day of May, 1995, Palmer acknowledged that the property subject to the
purchase and sale agreement between Scholzen and Palmer was subject to a Settlement
Agreement and a co-tenancy agreement." (Index 99, Page 4, Paragraph 19)
"On the 30th day of May, 1995, Palmer, by and through their counsel of record,
acknowledged that Palmer had been provided with a copy of the Settlement Agreement,
undated, between Dockstader; another third-party, namely, Huntsman; Russell J. Gallian and
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Scholzen." (Index 99, Page 4, Paragraph 20, and Index 97, Pages 227-228, 245-261 and
265-266)
There were extensive discussions and amicable relations between counsel for
Scholzen and Shawn Ferrin, counsel for Palmer.
On or before the 30th day of September, 1996, Clifford V.
Dunn, for and on behalf of Scholzen, requested a deed
restrictionfromShawn Ferrin, attorney for Palmer, which deed
restriction would reference the Settlement Agreement between
Dockstader and Scholzen, which is the subject of this litigation.
Shawn Ferrin indicated that Palmer was out of town and would
not be able to review the deed restriction. Shawn Ferrin further
indicated that Palmer was fully aware of the requirement to
provide a 20-foot easement for access across his property and
further that Palmer would be subject to the Settlement
Agreement. Shawn Ferrin indicated that Palmer's portion of the
purchase agreement was subject to a 1031 exchange, and that
the closing had to be completed by the 30th of September,
1996, or Palmer would lose their 1031 exchange favorable tax
treatment. Shawn Ferrin, for and in behalf of Palmer, requested
that Scholzen execute the Warranty Deed as it was prepared by
him, without the deed restriction, as an accommodation to
Palmer, and that Palmer would thereafter acknowledge and be
responsible for the Settlement Agreement.
(Index 99, Pages 4-5, Paragraph 24)
Scholzen, as an accommodation to Palmer, to help Palmer receive their tax free
benefit, did in fact rely upon the representations Shawn Ferrin, attorney for Palmer. Based
upon that reliance, Scholzen allowed the closing to go forward without the specific deed
restriction. (Index 99, Page 5, Paragraph 25)
Based upon the course of dealing between the parties over almost two years, it is
reasonable to infer that Scholzen acted reasonably. Scholzen's complaint specifically alleges
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that Scholzen was unaware that Palmer's promises were false. (Index 99, Pages 4-5,
Paragraph 24)
(8)

And was thereby induced to act:

That Scholzen went forward with the closing without the written deed restriction.
(Index 99, Page 5, Paragraph 25)
(9)

To that Party's injury and damage:

The damage Scholzen has received at this point has not been finally measured.
However, there is a judgment against Scholzen for breach of contract was failing to obtain
the agreement of Palmers' to provide the 20-foot easement, with a pending trial for damages
only. (Index 97, Page 728-730)
Taking the allegations and all reasonable inferences of Scholzen's complaint as true,
there is no question that Scholzen has made sufficient allegations in their complaint to
support a finding offraud,perpetrated by Palmers.
2.

The allegations of Scholzen's complaint are adequate
to support the cause of action for Negligent
Misrepresentation.

[T]he tort of negligent misrepresentation, which provides that
a party injured by reasonable reliance upon a second party's
careless or negligent misrepresentation of a material fact may
recover damages resulting from that injury when the second
party had a pecuniary interest in the transaction, was in a
superior position to know the material facts, and should have
reasonably foreseen that the injured party was likely to rely
upon the fact. Jardine v. Brunswick. 18 Utah 2d 378,381,423
P.2d 659,661-62 (1967); Christenson v. Commonwealth Land
Title Insurance Co.. Utah, 666 P.2d 302, 305 (1983);
Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins. Brown & Gunnel 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1988)
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There are sufficient allegations within Scholzen's complaint to establish that
Scholzen has been injured. (Index 99, Page 1 -6) There are also sufficient allegations within
Scholzen's complaint that the injury is a result of reasonable reliance upon Palmer's
representations that they would be bound by and subject to the terms and conditions of the
Settlement Agreement. (Index 99, Pages 4-5, Paragraphs 20-25) The misrepresentation was
of an extraordinarily material fact that Palmer would not be bound by the Settlement
Agreement.
Scholzen may recover damages if: (1) Palmer had a pecuniary interest in the
transaction; (2) Palmer was in a superior position to know the material fact; and (3) Palmer
should have reasonably foreseen that the injured party was likely to rely upon the fact.
Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins. Brown & GunnelL Id.
There is no question that Palmer had a pecuniary interest in the transaction. The
allegations of the complaint and all inferences relating thereto, relate to the purchase and
sale of real property. (Index 99, Page 3, Paragraph 17)
Palmer was in a superior position to know the material facts. Indeed Palmer was the
only person that could know that in spite of all of the representations, all of the negotiations,
and knowledge ofthe disclosures, that he would not, in actuality, follow up on his obligation
to be bound by the Settlement Agreement.
Palmer should have reasonably foreseen that the injured party was likely to rely upon
Palmer's representation that they were going to be bound by and subject to the Settlement
Agreement. Not only did Scholzen rely upon that misrepresentation, but Scholzen was
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specifically requested to rely upon that misrepresentation, which reliance provided a
particular benefit to Palmer to allow him to have a tax-free, 1031 exchange. This 1031
exchange presumably would immediately save taxes for Palmer. (Index 99, Pages 4-5,
Paragraph 24)
There are sufficient facts alleged and inferences from those allegations in the
complaint to support the finding of Negligent Misrepresentation.
3.

The allegations of Scholzen's complaint are adequate
to support the causes of action for Bad Faith.

In order to establish the causes of action relating to bad faith in the closing of the
purchase and sales agreement between Scholzen and Palmer and the actions of Palmer since
the closing, the finder of fact must establish as follows:
. . . one or more of the following factors existed: (i) The party
lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in
question; (ii) the party intended to take unconscionable
advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted with
the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder,
delay, or defraud others.
Cadv v.Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)
(i) The party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question:
The allegations of Scholzen's complaint show that, (1) Palmer had received the Settlement
Agreement, acknowledged the receipt of the Settlement Agreement; (2) Palmer conducted
more than a year of "due diligence" by themselves, and by and through their attorney of
record; (3) Palmer received the Quit-Claim Deeds that provided title of the property to
Scholzen (which Quit-Claim Deeds showed deed restrictions); (4) Palmer then made
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representations specifically, by and through their attorney, of his intentions to abide by and
be subject to the Settlement Agreement; (5) Palmer, after the closing of the Purchase and
Sale Agreement, conducted extensive negotiation with the Dockstader Parties, apparently,
in furtherance of their agreement to be bound by and subject to the Settlement Agreement;
(6) Only after Dockstader sued Palmer did Palmer say that they did not agree to be bound
by the Settlement Agreement. Scholzen believes that these specific facts and the inferences
therefrom, as contained in Scholzen's complaint, clearly show that Palmer lacked an honest
belief in the propriety of his activities.
(ii) The party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others:
Upon review of Scholzen's complaint, it is apparent that Palmer set a trap for
Scholzen. Palmer received all of the documents, reviewed all of the documents, had counsel
review all of the documents, and then requested the favor of Scholzen to complete the
transaction without deed restrictions, all for the benefit of Palmer. After a year and a half
of activity and due diligence. After a year and a half of having possession of all documents
and referring to the Settlement Agreement and the terms and conditions of the Settlement
Agreement, after conducting negotiations with the Dockstader Parties for six months, then
only after being sued by Dockstader Parties, Palmer then, and only then, stated that they
would not be bound by or subject to the Settlement Agreement. Palmer made the assertion
that Palmer would not be bound or subject to the Settlement Agreement knowing that
Scholzen had been sued in the same litigation. Such actions are clearly actions taken by
individuals who intend to take unconscionable advantage of others.
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(iii)

The party intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in

question would hinder, delay, or defraud others:
To avoid repetition, Scholzen will simply state that the activities and representations
of Palmer when taken in total, as alleged in Scholzen's complaint, clearly show an intention
to defraud Scholzen. (See argument regarding elements of Fraud, supra)
4.

The allegations of Scholzen's complaint are adequate
to support the cause of action for Willful Misconduct

The actions of Palmer are either grounded in fraud, in bad faith, or grounded in
negligence and willful misconduct.
The line of culpability between that conduct which is simply negligent
and that conduct which is clearly intentional is a matter of degree.
And at some point along the line, accumulated aggravation of
negligence amounts to willful misconduct.
Strange v. Ostlund. 594 P.2d 877 (Utah 1979)
Willful misconduct is a matter of degree. The same factual allegations that support
a claim for negligent misrepresentation support a claim for willful misconduct if the trier of
fact finds Palmer's activities are egregious enough. For purposes of a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the allegation of willful misconduct pursuant to the sixth cause
of action, together with the facts alleged in the factual allegation section of the complaint,
and the specific statements found in the third cause of action relating to negligent
misrepresentation require the reversal of the trial court's decision.
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II.

The trial court erred in dismissing Scholzen's complaint on
the grounds that Scholzen's six causes of action were barred
by the Doctrine of Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion).

On April 30,1997, Dale R. Dockstader and Dale R. Huntsman (hereinafter referred
to as "Dockstader") filed a complaint as Plaintiffs versus Scholzen Products Co., Kent
Palmer and Robin Palmer. (Case No. 970500787) Said complaint provided three causes of
action. One for breach of contract by Scholzen and two causes of action against Defendants
Kent and Robin Palmer, one cause of action for interference with easement, and the other
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. (Index 97, Pages 4-6)
Scholzen answered Plaintiffs' complaint and counterclaimed against Dockstader.
Scholzen also crossclaimed against Palmer for indemnification. (Index 97, Pages 22-31)
Palmers answered the original complaint by Dockstader on July 11,1997, (Index 97,
Pages 35-41) and answered Scholzen's crossclaim on July 29,1997. (Index 97, Pages 4449b)
On the 20th of August, 1997, Dockstader filed a motion for partial summary
judgment against Scholzen, with supporting memorandum. (Index 97, Pages 49a-85)
From August, 1997 through and including May of 1998, no material actions were
taken in the case, allowing time for settlement negotiations. (Index 97, Page 746 at Page 6,
lines 1-14)
No discovery was undertaken until September 30,1998. (Index 97, Page 746, at Page
6, lines 21-25, and Page 7, lines 1-9)
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On September 22,1998, the two causes of action against Palmer were dismissed by
stipulation. (Index 97, Pages 382-385)
Motions, with supporting memoranda, were filed, pursuant to a scheduling order, by
October 15, 1998. (Index 97, Pages 416-538)
November 12,1998, the trial court heard oral argument on the pending motions. The
motions heard were: (1) Dockstader's second motion for summary judgment against
Scholzen; (2) Palmers' motion for summary judgment on Scholzen's crossclaim; (3)
Scholzen's motion to amend Scholzen's answer, counterclaim and crossclaim; and (4)
Scholzen's motion to amend scheduling order. (Index 97, Page 718)
In the Dockstader case, the trial court granted Dockstader's motion for partial
summary judgment against Scholzen as to the issue of breach of contract against Scholzen
on Dockstader's first cause of action. (Index 97, Page 728-730) The court also entered its
order dismissing Scholzen's crossclaim against Palmers. The court also denied Scholzen's
motion to amend its answer, crossclaim and counterclaim and Scholzen's motion to amend
the scheduling order. (Index 97, Page 731-734)
A.

The doctrine of res judicata does not bar Scholzen's
complaint in this matter because two of the three
required elements of Res Judicata did not exist in the
1997 Dockstader case.

The doctrine of "res judicata has two branches: . . . ""claim
preclusion" . . . refers to the branch which has often been
referred to as "res judicata" or "merger and bar."" In re General
Determination. 982 P.2d at 70. ""Issue preclusion" . . . refers
to the branch often termed "collateral estoppel."" Burleigh v.
Turner. 15 Utah 2d 118, 120; 388 P.2d 412,414 (Utah 1964)
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as cited in Boudreaux v. State. (Ct. App. 1999)
The first branch of Res Judicata, Claim Preclusion, requires three elements:
A party arguing that claim preclusion bars an action against it
must show that: (1) "both cases... involve the same parties or
their privies"; (2) "the claim that is alleged to be barred must
have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could
and should have been raised in the first action"; and (3) "the
first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits."
State Ex Rel.T.J.v. State. 325 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,945 P.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1997) as quoted
in Macris & Assocs. v. Newavs. Inc.. 374 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Ct. App. 1999)
1.

Element (1) does exist; both cases involve the same
parties or their privies.

In this particular .case, Palmer and Scholzen were involved in the 1997 Dockstader
case on Scholzen's crossclaim against Palmer. Therefore, element number 1 of claim
preclusion does exist.
2.

Element (2), does not exist; the claim that is alleged to
be barred must have been presented in the first suit,
or must be one that could and should have been
raised in the first action.

Element number (2) does not exist because Scholzen was not allowed to present the
claims made in this case in the 1997 Dockstader case. Judge Beacham, of the Fifth Judicial
District Court, in the body of the judgment granting Palmer's motion for summary judgment
on Scholzen's counterclaim states, "The court denied Scholzen's Motion to Amend its
Answer, Cross-Claim and Counterclaim and Scholzen's Motion to Amend Scheduling
Order." (Index 97, Page 732) Scholzen's proposed amended answer, crossclaim and
counterclaim included crossclaims against Palmer which were the same as those brought
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in the present action. (Compare Scholzen's Proposed Amended Answer, Counterclaim and
Crossclaim attached to Scholzen's memorandum in support of its motion to amend said
answer, counterclaim and crossclaim. (Index 97, Pages 461-483) to the complaint filed in
the present case (Index 99, Pages 1-12))
Scholzen tried to bring those six causes of action in the Dockstader case, but
Scholzen was not allowed to bring those claims.
Judge Beacham, in his Memorandum Decision, stated,
Scholzen9s proposed amendments are brought late in this
litigation, after considerable discovery, time and expense, but
are based on alleged facts of which Scholzen seems to have had,
or should have had, knowledgefromvery near the outset of this
case, without providing the Court with an adequate explanation
for the delay.
(Index 97, Pages 724-725)
Judge Beacham denied Scholzen's motion to amend its crossclaim against Palmer,
for a number of reasons. The first was that "Scholzen's proposed amendments are brought
late in this litigation after considerable discovery,..." That is not true. There had not been
considerable discovery. The only discovery were two depositions performed on September
30,1998, fifteen days before the motion deadline in the scheduling order. One deposition
was of Mr. Bruce Ballard and one deposition was of Mr. Dale Dockstader. The lack of
considerable discovery was specifically mentioned to the court in oral argument at the
November 12,1998 hearing. (Index 97, Page 746 at Page 6, lines 1-21)
Judge Beacham further stated that "Scholzen9s proposed amendments... are based
on alleged facts of which Scholzen seems to have had, or should have had, knowledge from
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very near the outset of this case,... ". Generally people do not know when they are being
defrauded.
On March 30, 1995, Scholzen's counsel received a fax of "new language" of
Paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement. The fax had a cover sheet which included the
following language, in counsel for Dockstader's handwriting, "Enclosed find proposed
changes in Paragraph 14 of the Scholzen/Dockstader agreement. I think it conveys what
Palmer & Dockstader discussed. Please review and comment. If it is O.K. we can sign
immediately." (Index 97, Page 277) This fax indicated that Palmer and Dockstader had
specifically negotiated the language of said Paragraph 14.
The Settlement Agreement was entered into in April of 1995.
On May 4, 1995, the Settlement Agreement, together with Quit-Claim Deeds, with
deed restrictions, and other documents were delivered to Palmer.
From May 4, 1995, to September 30, 1996, Palmer and his counsel conducted
extensive due diligence. (Index 97, Pages 277-278). On or about September 30, 1996,
Shawn Ferrin, counsel for Palmer, specifically acknowledged the Settlement Agreement and
the responsibilities of the Settlement Agreement and fiirther acknowledged that Palmer
would be bound by and subject to the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement.
Immediately after the sale of the property by Scholzen's to Palmer, Palmer entered
into extensive and protracted negotiations with Dockstader. Dockstader then began the
Dockstader lawsuit in April of 1997. In Palmer's answer to Scholzen's crossclaim, Palmer
made a general denial of the paragraph alleging Palmer's agreement to be bound by the
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Settlement Agreement. (Index 97, Page 45, Paragraph 8) Very limited actions were
undertaken in the lawsuit in early 1997. The lawsuit was continued over a periodfrom1997
to May of 1998 to allow Dockstader and Palmer to continue to negotiate. (Index 97, Pages
92-96)
On July 7,1998, an Affidavit of Shawn Ferrin and an Affidavit of Kent Palmer were
filed, indicating that Palmer contended that he was not bound by the Settlement Agreement
or subject to the Settlement Agreement, and that Palmer had not agreed to be bound by the
Settlement Agreement. (Index 97, Page 320, Paragraph 11)
In July of 1998, was the first time that Scholzen had received a definitive assertion
from either Palmer or his counsel, Shawn Ferrin, that they disputed their agreement to be
bound by and subject to the Settlement Agreement. That assertion was contained in the
affidavits received as part of the memoranda in support of motion for summary judgment.
All other statements and all actions of Palmer, including negotiations before Dockstader's
lawsuit, and negotiations in settlement after Dockstader's lawsuit, indicated that Palmer
would be bound by, and subject to, the Settlement Agreement. The only exception was one
general denial in the answer to crossclaim. It is Scholzen9s position that there were never
enough facts presented to warn Scholzen of thefraud,negligent misrepresentation, bad faith
or willful misconduct of Palmer until very shortly before the motions hearing.
Scholzen believes that Judge Beacham was incorrect in denying Scholzen's motion
to amend the crossclaim of Scholzen against Palmer. The very denial of Scholzen's motion
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to amend made it impossible for Scholzen to raise the tortious claims against Palmer that are
the basis of the complaint in the present action.
Since the second element of Res Judicata, Claim Preclusion, did not exist, Res
Judicata did not exist.
3.

Element (3), as required by Res Judicata, Claim
Preclusion does not apply because the specific claims
made by Scholzen in this action did not reach final
judgment on the merits.

As has already been stated, Judge Beacham denied Scholzen's motion to amend its
crossclaim against Palmer to include the six causes of action based in fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct. Those claims were never presented in
any way to the court, therefore, none of Scholzen's tort claims against Palmer were fully
litigated to a judgment on the merits.
For Res Judicata to apply, all three elements must be found. The only element
existing is that both cases involve the same parties. The other two required elements are not
present. Therefore, Res Judicata or Claim Preclusion does not apply.
III.

The trial court erred by dismissing Scholzen's complaint on
the grounds that Scholzen9s six causes of action are barred
by the doctrine of collateral of estoppel (issue preclusion).
A.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)
does not barr Scholzen's complaint because three of
the four elements required for collateral estoppel are
lacking in this case.

The Issue Preclusion, Collateral Estoppel, branch of Res
Judicata has four requirements:
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First, the issue challenged must be identical in the previous
action and in the case at hand. Second, the issue must have
been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the previous
action. Third, the issue must been competently, fully, and fairly
litigated in the previous action. Fourth, the party against whom
collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action must have
been either a party or privy to a party in the previous action.
Gardner v. Madsen. 949 P.2d 785, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct. App. 1997)
An issue, as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, is "A point in dispute
between two or more parties".
In the 1997 Dockstader case, the issue presented by Scholzen's crossclaim was that
Kent and Robin Palmer had entered into an agreement with Scholzen to be subject to, and
responsible for, the terms and requirements of the Settlement Agreement between
Dockstader and Scholzen. The trial court, by summary judgment, issued its order stating
that Palmers motion for summary judgment was granted. In the Memorandum Decision,
the court acknowledged that the reason Palmer's motion for summary judgment should be
granted is, "Those issues are not material to Palmer's Motion, however, because Scholzen
has conceded that Palmer's Motion should be granted and that Scholzen's crossclaim for
indemnification should be dismissed." (Index 97, Page 724) (emphasis added) Scholzen
had claimed that Palmer had entered into the agreement, Palmer claimed that they had
not. That issue was resolved in Palmer's favor.
Thefirstelement of Collateral Estoppel requires the issue challenged to be identical.
The issues raised by the complaint in this case are completely different. Scholzen claims that
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Palmer was out to trick, defraud and cheat Scholzen. Palmer simply made a motion to
dismiss.
Scholzen further claims, in the alternative, that Palmer made negligent
misrepresentations that lead Scholzen to act in a way detrimental to Scholzen. Scholzen also
claims that Palmer intentionally acted in a negligent fashion in such a way to cause damage
to Scholzen.
The claims made by Scholzen raise issues relating to the intent of Palmer. For
example, did Palmer act in a way such as to harm Scholzen, did Palmer have a duty to
Scholzen to act in a certain manner and did Palmer violate that duty, and was the conduct
of Palmer sufficiently egregious as to qualify for willful misconduct? All of these issues are
completely different than the issues presented by the initial crossclaim. Since they are
different, the first element of collateral estoppel, that the issue challenged must be identical
to the previous action and in the case at hand, is lacking.
The second element is also lacking because the issues raised by Scholzen's complaint
in the present action were not presented to the court for determination because Judge
Beacham's ruling prohibited the amendment of the crossclaim by Scholzen against Palmer.
Therefore, the second element of collateral estoppel is lacking.
The third element of collateral estoppel is also lacking. The issues must have been
competently, fully and thoroughly litigated in a previous action. There was no litigation at
all of those issues because the amendment to the crossclaim was never even filed. The only
issues completely and fully litigated had to do with whether or not Palmer agreed to be
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bound by the Settlement Agreement. The court found that Palmer had not agreed to be
bound by the Settlement Agreement. Scholzen believes that decision to be wrong.
Nevertheless, even if that decision by the court is correct, that decision only relates to
Scholzen's crossclaim for indemnification based in contract, and not the causes pled in
Scholzen9 s present complaint. The causes pled in Scholzen5 s present complaint are founded
in tort.
People are often not held responsible for contractual promises they make, but they are
still held responsible for the false statements, trickery and the efforts to cheat and harm
others.
The fourth element of collateral estoppel is present here, in that Scholzen and Palmer
have been in conflict over the crossclaim in the Dockstader 1997 case.
CONCLUSION
The complaint filed by Scholzen against Palmer should not have been dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Sufficient elements were pled in
Scholzen's complaint to support claims against Palmer for fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct.
Scholzen's complaint should not have been dismissed because Res Judicata barred
its claims. The only cause of action between Palmer and Scholzen in the first case was a
claim for indemnification based in contract. Claims offraud,negligent misrepresentation,
willful misconduct and bad faith are nothing like a simple claim for indemnification. The
elements to establish a claim for indemnification are totally different then the elements
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required to establish claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, willful misconduct and
bad faith.
The complaint of Scholzen against Palmer should not have been dismissed based
upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the issues between the parties are totally
different. The issues in the initial crossclaim had to do with contract formation, statute of
frauds, and so forth. The issues relating to the causes of the instant case are based upon
honesty, intent, harm and duty. The issues are vastly different.
Judge Beacham, himself, said in his Memorandum Decision, "Furthermore,
Scholzen's proposed amended crossclaims are all in the nature of tort claims, while the
subject of this action and all discovery conducted by the parties has involved, to this point,
only contract claims." (Index 97, Page 725)
One of the fundamental reasons for Judge Beacham9 s prohibition of the amendment
of Scholzen9s crossclaim is exactly why the present complaint is not barred by collateral
estoppel; the new claims and issues were in tort, while the first case was in contract.
It is respectfully requested, therefore, that the Court of Appeals reverse the trial court
decision, and remand for trial on Scholzen9s complaint.
DATED this / 6

day of December, 1999.
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I hereby certify that on the
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PAUL D. VEASY (3964)
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

SCHOLZEN PRODUCTS COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT

vs.
KENT PALMER and ROBIN PALMER,
individuals,

Civil No. 990500428
Judge James L. Shumate

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

This matter came on regularly for hearing before the court, the Honorable James
L. Shumate presiding, on Wednesday, May 26, 1999. Pending before the court was Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff Scholzen Products Company was represented by Clifford V. Dunn.
Defendants Kent Palmer and Robin Palmer were represented by Paul D. Veasy of Parsons Behle
& Latimer.
273527.1

The court considered the motion and memoranda of the parties and the pertinent
pleadings in the case of Dale Dockstader et al. v. Scholzen Products Company, Kent Palmer and
Robin Palmer et al. Case No. 970500787, currently pending in the Fifth Judicial District Court
for Washington County, including the Memorandum Decision, dated December 1, 1998, of
Judge G. Rand Beacham. Having also heard oral argument from the parties and good cause
appearing it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff Scholzen Products Company's Complaint is dismissed.
DATED this / b day of June, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

honorable James I^Shumate
District Court Judge* v\\-£J *
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

^

Clifford V. Dunn
Attorney for Plaintiff

273527.1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2-7 day of May, 1999,1 caused to be mailed, first
class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS, to:
Clifford V. Dunn
170 North 400 East, Suite G
P.O. Box 2318
St. George, Utah 84771-2318
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COPY
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT
Jeffrey C.Wilcox #4441
59 South 100 East
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-1682
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DALE DOCKSTADER and DALE R.
HUNTSMAN,

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCHOLZEN PRODUCTS CO., KENT and
ROBIN PALMER, and JOHN DOES 1-V,
Defendants.

Civil No. 970500787 CN
Judge G. Rand Beacham

The court entered its Memorandum Decision in this case on December 2, 1998, wherein,
among other things, it granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against
Defendant Scholzen Products Co. Based upon the court's ruling in said Memorandum Decision,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:
1. As a matter of law, Scholzen Products Co. has breached the April 1995 Settlement
Agreement between Plaintiffs and Scholzen Products Co. Consequently, Plaintiffs are entitled to

the entry of Partial Summary Judgment as to the issue of breach of contract against Scholzen on
Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action.
2. The issue of Plaintiffs' damages and other appropriate relief will be determined at
trial.
DATED this %P day of l O & C -

1998.

BY THE COURT:

£,e&

G. Rand Beacham
District Court Judge
SUBMITTED BY:

Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct unsigned copy of the above and foregoing
document, postage prepaid on this Jdt^rday of December, 1998.
Clifford V. Dunn, Esq.
170 North 400 East #G
P.O. Box 2318
St. George, Utah 84771
Shawn C. Ferrin, Esq.
Paul D. Veasy, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898

iklfhSecretary
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and cocmct signed, copy of the above and foregoing
document, postage prepaid on this ffil day ofDJcmb|r,'Ty98, to the following:
Clifford V. Dunn, Esq.
170 North 400 East #G
P.O. Box 2318
St. George, Utah 84771
Shawn C. Ferrin, Esq.
Paul D. Veasy, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-Q898

:cretary
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PAUL D. VEASY (3964)
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants Kent and
Robin Palmer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

DALE DOCKSTADER and DALE R.
HUNTSMAN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCHOLZEN PRODUCTS CO., KENT and
ROBIN PALMER, and JOHN DOES I-V,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS
PALMER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
DEFENDANT SCHOLZEN
PRODUCTS' CROSS-CLAIM
Case No. 970500787
Judge G. Rand Beacham

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

This matter came on regularly for hearing before the court, the Honorable G. Rand
Beacham presiding, on Thursday, November 12, 1998. Pending for hearing were four separate
motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against Scholzen Products
Company, (2) Defendants Kent and Robin Palmer's Motion for Summary Judgment on
Defendant Scholzen Products' Cross-Claim, (3) Defendant Scholzen Products' Motion to Amend

Defendant Scholzen Product Company's Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, and (4)
Defendant Scholzen Products' Motion to Amend Scheduling Order.
Plaintiffs Dale Dockstader and Dale R. Huntsman were represented by Jeffrey C. Wilcox
of Gallian, Westfall, Wilcox & Wright. Defendant Scholzen Products Company was represented
by Clifford V. Dunn. Defendants Palmers were represented by Paul D. Veasy of Parsons Behle
& Latimer.
The court considered the motions, memoranda and affidavits filed by the parties and
heard oral argument from counsel. The court took the motions under submission. On December
1, 1998, the court issued its Memorandum Decision. With respect to Plaintiffs' Second Motion
for Summary Judgment Against Scholzen Products Company, the court granted the motion and
requested plaintiffs' counsel to submit a judgment pursuant to CJA Rule 4-504. With respect to
Palmers' Motion for Summary Judgment on Scholzen's Cross-Claim, the court grated the motion
and requested counsel for the Palmers to submit a judgment pursuant to CJA Rule 4-504. The
court denied Scholzen's Motion to Amend its Answer, Cross-Claim and Counterclaim and
Scholzen's Motion to Amend Scheduling Order.
Based upon the Memorandum Decision, along with other good cause appearing, it is
hereby
ORDERED that the Palmers' Motion for Summary Judgment on Scholzen's Cross-Claim
is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that Scholzen's Cross-Claim against the Palmers is hereby dismissed.

:J>«>?4 I
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DATED this

day of December, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

Av&

G. Rand Beacham
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT

Jeffrey C. Wilcox
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Clifford V. Dunn
Attorney for Defendant Scholzen
Products Company

24*074 I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

/C? day of December, 1998,1 caused to be mailed, first

class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS PALMER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT
SCHOLZEN PRODUCTS' CROSS-CLAIM, to:
Jeffrey C. Wilcox
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT
59 South 100 East
St. George, Utah 84770
Clifford V. Dunn
P.O. Box 2318
St. George, Utah 84771-2318
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DALE DOCKSTADER and DALE R.
HUNTSMAN,

(
<

Plaintiffs,
v.
SCHOLZEN PRODUCTS CO ,
KENT and ROBIN PALMER, et al.,
Defendants.

([

MEMORANDUM DECISION

11
'
(
{

Civil No. 970500787
Judge G. Rand Beacham

(

This case came before the Court on November 12, 1998 for a hearing on four separate
motions: (1) Plaintiffs' "Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against Scholzen Products Co.",
(2) "Defendants Kent and Robin Palmer's Motion for Summary- Judgment on Defendant Scholzen
Products' Crossciaim," (3) Defendant Scholzen Products' "Motion to Amend Defendant Scholzen
Products Co 's Answer, Counterclaim and Crossclaim," and (4) Defendant Scholzen Products*
"Motion to Amend Scheduling Order."
The Court, after hearing oral argument, after reviewing the parties' memoranda, affidavits and
exhibits, and after reviewing relevant Utah law, rules as follows.
L Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Scholzen Products
A. Memoranda
Plaintiffs' original Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Scholzen Products Co.
("Scholzen") requested that the Court determine as a matter of law that Scholzen had breached its

contract with Plaintiffs by failing to obligate defendants Kent and Room Palmer ("Palmers") to grant
PlaintS an easement. At the scheduled hearing on July 16, 1998, the Court denied the Motion and
entered the following oral ailing into the record from the bench:
The statement of facts in Plaintiffs' memorandum contains very few references to the
record and no foundation for the documents attached to the memorandum. The rules
require that each paragraph of statement of facts contain a reference to the record,
and that documents that are submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment
be supplied by proper foundational affidavits. In addition, Scholzen Products
Company's response did not properly contradict the statements in Dockstader's
memorandum. Had the moving parties' statement of facts been properly supported,
those facts would have been deemed admitted for purposes of the rule. As it is, the
motion is denied for failure to demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material
fact. The Motion is denied.
Coun Video Record, Tape No. 98025-B, at 2.59
The Memorandum in support of Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Paruai Summary Judgment,
again referring to the 5rst cause of action of their Complaint, more carefully provides the necessary
references to support the "Undisputed Far*s" asserted in the Memorandum The Coun finds that the
statements in paragraphs 1, 3 (first phrase), 4, 6 through 12, and 14 through 19 are adequately
supported by affidavits, depositions and other foundational references.1
Scholzen's opposing Memorandum contains a section titled "Undisputed Facts'* with several
accurate supporting references. The Coun finds that paragraphs 1 through 3, 5 through 7, 9 and 10

statement in paragraph 2 is not supported by the reference made, but is immatenoi. The statement in
paragraph 3 (second phrase) is not supported by the reference made, but is sufficiently established by the fenn of the
document mentioned The statements made in paragraphs 5 and 13 have no evidentiary foundation, but there is no reai
issue as to the content or identity of the documents reterrec to, and the statements mace are vinuaily seif-evident frum
other unchailenecd sources.
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(first sentence only) are properly supported.2 Scholzen then continues with a section titled "Disputed
Facss" which, despite the title, consists entirely of arguments and legal conclusions
Scholzen's response fails to meet the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administradon and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Tnose rules do not allow a party
opposing a motion for summary judgment to simply provide a new statement of facts in the
alternative to the moving party's statement of facts, leaving the Court to compare and contrast
competing lists of asserted facts to determine whether any issue of fact can be identified. Rule 4-501
(2)(B) requires the opposing party to specifically identify "each disputed fact" and to demonstrate to
the Court, by specific controverting facts, that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Otherwise, the
moving party's statements of fact are to be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment.
Scholzen's Memorandum fails to specifically controvert any of Plaintiffs' "Undisputed FactsM and
those facts are deemed admitted for the purpose of Plaintiffs* Motion.3 The essentia! portions of
those facts are as follows:
£. Facts
In April of 1995, plaintiff Dockstader and Scholzen entered into a Settlement Agreement
regarding a 28 acre parcel of property (the %4Subject Property"), which resulted in each party owning
an undivided interest in the Subject Property The Settlement Agreement is attached to Plaintiffs'
There is no evidentiary foundation for the statement and document mentioned in paragraph 4. There is no

evidentiary foundation for the document mentioned in paragraph 8, and the document docs not support the assertion
made. The statements of all except the first sentence of paragraph 10 are hearsay and inadmissible in opposition to a
summary judgment motion. The statements in paragraphs 11 and 12 assume facts which are not otherwise propcriy
supported and, even if properly supported, would be irrelevant to the issue raised by Plaintiffs* Motion.
Furthermore, the admissible portions of Scholzen's "Undisputed Facts" would not raise any genuine issues of
material feet, even if they were propcriy presented
3

Memorandum and to Schoben's Memorandum.

Paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement

provides that, if either parry thereto sells its interest in the Subject Property, the selling party has an
obligation regarding an easement for access to the Subject Property, In relevant pan, paragraph 14
states

. . . Specifically, the parties understand that Dockstader is the owner of the twenty foot
easement which runs over property now owned by Kent and Robin Palmer, which property
lies on the west side of the Virgin River. Said easement gives access, but not buildabie access
to the property that is the subject matter of this agreement. The parties agree that if either
parry sells their undivided interest to Kent and Robin Palmer and/or the Palmers' assigns, that
the Dockstader easement shall be used by the non-selling pany for access to the propeny
Additionally, the selling party shall obtain an agreement with the Palmers and/or their assigns,
such that Palmers will donate 20 additional feet of their property located on the west side of
the Virgin River such that said 20 feet combined with the Dockstader easement will be used
as a roadway access from Highway 9 to the property that is the subject matter of this
agreement
On May 4, 1995. Scholzen and Palmers entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement for Palmers to
purchase Schotzen's interest in the Subject Propeny This Purchase and Sale Agreement made no
mention of the Settlement Agreement between Scholzen and Dockstader, and did not include any
agreement obligating Palmers to "donate 20 additional feet of their proper^ "
Dockstader learned of the pending Schoizen/Palmer agreement before the purchase and sals
was closed. Dockstader contacted Scholzen and its attorney and reminded them of the provisions
of paragraph 14 of their Settlement Agreement, warning them that he did not believe that Palmers
would agree to donate the additional footage if that agreement was not obtained before closing of
Scholzen's sale to Palmers. Scholzen assured Dockstader that it would not sell its interest to Palmen
without first obtaining an agreement from Palmers to donate the additional footage
The Schoizen/Palmer agreement was closed near the end of September of 1996, and
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Scholzen's interest in the Subject Property was conveyed to Palmers Neither the deed conveying
Scholzen'$ interest nor any other document contains any agreement by Palmers to donate additional
footage as required by the Settlement Agreement. When Dockstader learned of this situation, he
again contacted Scholzen, but he was told that he should negotiate the marter with Palmers
Dockstader has attempted to do so, but without success Palmers have never agreed to be bound by
the Settlement Agreement or to grant Dockstader any additional footage
Plaintiffs Dockstader and Huntsman subsequently brought suit against both Scholzen and
Palmers, claiming breach of contract b> Scholzen, and interference with the casement and breach of
fiduciary duty by the Palmers Plaintiffs have since dismissed their claims against the Palmers In
connection with its answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint, Scholzen filed a Cross-Claim against Palmers
seeking damages and a determination thai the Palmers had in fact agreed to grant an easement to
Dockstader, and a Counterclaim against Plaintiffs claiming bad faith and seeking damages.
C Analysts
Plaintiffs argue that the facts demonstrate that Scholzen sold its interest in the Subject
Property without obtaining an agreement with Palmers to donate additional footage, and that this
constitutes a clear breach of the Settlement Agreement Scholzen first argues that the language of
paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement is ambiguous, because Plaintiffs* Complaint alleges that
Scholzen breached the Settlement Agreement by failing to obtain "an easement" whle paragraph 14
requires that it obtain "an agreementf% The Court ts not persuaded that an ambiguity in a contract
may be foundfroman allegation in a complaint, particularly where the clear contractual language is
quoted in the allegations of the complaint The Court agrees that paragraph 14 did not require
5

Scholzen to do more than obtain an agreement with Palmers for the additional footage, and Plaintiffs'
incorrect allegation does not change the obvious meaning of paragraph 14 Contracniai ambiguity
consists of differing reasonable interpretations of given contractual language, not from an entirely
illogical allegation that, for example, the word "black" really means "white." Paragraph 14 clearly
requires the selling parry to "obtain an agreement with the Palmers."
Scholzen also argues that it did obtain an agreement with Palmers, but can provide no
admissible evidence of such an agreement; Scholzen cannot rely on discussions between Doclcstader
and Palmers, especially those occurring after it sold its interest in the Subject Property, to meet its
own pre-saie obligation. Scholzen argues that it was misled, that it relied on alleged representations
regarding Plaintiffs* discussions with Palmers, that paragraph 14 was a mistake (apparently its
unilateral mistake), and that Palmers were, in seme unidentified way, bound by the Senlement
Agreement to which they were net a pany or signatory.

Scholzen has provided absolutely no

admissible evidence to supper: these arguments, however. Scholzen also argues about what it would
have done or would not have done, but for the alleged misrepresentations and mistakes, but it cannot
identify any manner in which it obtained from Palmers either an easement or an agreement for an
easement or donation of additional footage. Even if statute of frauds issues and the inadmissibility
of some of Scholzen's offered evidence are ignored for the sake of argument, Scholzen has identified
nothing to demonstrate that it even attempted to meet its obligation, except vague and truly
ambiguous allusions in (a) one fax cover sheet from Plaintiffs' attorney and (b) one noncommittal
letter from Palmers' attorney, prior to his receipt of a title insurance commitment, requesting
information on Scholzen's agreements with Plaintiffs.
6
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The Court concludes that Schoben sold its interest in the Subject Property without first
obtaining from Palmers an agreement to donate the additional footage which the Settlement
Agreement obligated it to obtain. Consequently, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment against
Scholzen on their first cause of action, with Plaintiffs' damages and other appropriate relief to be
determined after trial. The Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted, and Plaintiffs'
counsel should submit a judgment pursuant to CJA Rule 4-504.
Z Palmer's Motion for Summary Judgment on Scholzcn *s Crossclaim
Palmers' Motion and supporting Memorandum meet all standards of applicable rules, and
their argument is entirely consistent with casting Utah law. Plaintiffs dispute Palmers' assertions that
Palmers have agreed to relocate an easement to the Subject Property, that Plaintiffs have accepted
Palmers' proposal for an additional 10-foot easement, and that the municipal authority has approved
the resulting 30-foot access easement. Plaintiffs1 memorandum and references to the record meet all
standards of applicable rules, and raise genuine issuej[of fact. Those issues are not material to
Palmers* Motion, however, because Scholzen has conceded that Palmers' Motion should be granted
and that Scholzerrc crossclaim for indemnificatton>should be dismissed.
Consequently, Palmers' Motion is granted, and Palmers' counsel should submit a judgment
pursuant to CJA Rule 4-504.
5. Scholzen's Motion to Amend its Annver, Cross-Gaim, and Counterclaim
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to grant a party leave to amend
its pleadings when "justice so requires." Scholzen's proposed amendments are brought late in this
litigation, after considerable discovery, time and expense, but are based on alleged faas of which

Scholzen seems to have had% or should have had, knowledge from very near the outset of the case,
without providing the Coun with an adequate explanation for the delay The courts generally do not
consider that justice requires them to allow amendment in such circumstances Cf Swift Stop. Inc
v Wight. 845 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah App. 1992)
Furthermore, Schoteen's proposed amended crossciaims are all in the nature of ton claims,
while the subject of this acrion and all discovery conducted by the panics has involved, to this point,
only contract claims

As a general rule, ton actions and claims for punitive damages are not

actionable within a contract claim, unless the alleged acts also suppon a cause of action in tort See,
e-g., Foley v I D C . 765 P 2d 373 (Cal. 1988). In addition, Scholzen has demonstrated virtually no
faoual basis for the proposed claims, and the couns generally refuse to allow leave to amend the
pleadings when the proposed changes appear futile

Set, e.g., Reagan v Bankers Trust Co . 863

F.Supp 1511, 1518 (D Utah 1994).
Finally, Scholzen's proposed change of theones would prejudice the opposing panics by
requiring them to bear the cost of additional discovery and litigation after virtually all other issues in
this action are resolved. For this and the other reasons stated above, Scholzen's Motion to Amend
its Ax^wer, Crossclaim and Counterclaim is denied.
4. Scholzen1 s Motion to Amend Scheduling Order
Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a coun to enlarge a specified time limit
"for cause " In addition, the Scheduling Order itself mandates that it shall be altered only upon a
showing of "manifest injustice " Since Scholzen's Motion to Amend its Answer, Crossclaim and
Counterclaim has been denied, the Coun 5nds no cause to amend the scheduling order. The Court
8

alsofindsthat allowing further delays of this litigation would itself be manifestly unjust, particularly
infightof the other rulings contained in this decision Consequently, Schoteen's Motion to Amend
Scheduling Order is also denied
Dated this

day of December, 1998.

&.Qw~$fedr

G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this a*

day of December, 1998 I provided true and correct

copies of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION to each of the attorneys named below by
placing a copy in such attorney's file at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah, and/or by
placing a copy in the United States Mailfirst-classpostage prepaid, and addressed as follows:

Jeffrey C Wilcox
59 S. 100 E.
St. George, Utah 84770
Paul D. Veasy
PO Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Clifford V. Dunn
PO Box 2318
St. George, Utah 84771

DEPUTY? COURT CjjERK
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